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COMMENT 
In the Title IX Race Toward Gender 
Equity\ the Black Female Athlete Is Left 
to Finish Last: The Lack of Access 
for the ''Invisible Woman. " 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Although each of us is defined by race and gender, those of us who 
are neither white nor male often experience invisibility as a result of 
our dual subordinate status .... Black women have been dispropor-
tionately located at the lower end of the economic hierarchy and, 
therefore, have been unable to afford private golf, swimming, or 
tennis lessons. Overt racial discrimination prevented black women 
from gaining access to the sports participated in by white women. 
To the extent that the main thrust of solutions to gender inequity 
and a lack of adherence to Title IX mandates has been the addition 
of opportunities in the country club sports or those sports not tradi-
tionally accessible to Black women, we lose yet again.3 
America is undeniably preoccupied with sports. The high level of 
enthusiasm generated in this country by 'the thrill of victory and the 
agony of defeat' clearly demonstrates that "[ s ]ports constitute an im-
1. Alfred Mathewson notes in his essay that "(t]he phrase 'gender equity' was coined to 
describe efforts to use the law to address the historical imbalance in the treatment of girls and 
women in athletics in the twentieth century." Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Essay, Black Women, 
Gender Equity and the Function at The Junction, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239, 245 (1996). 
2. The concept of the "Invisible Woman" can be found in several writings: See, e.g., 
Marilyn Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 229, 234 (1996) (stating 
that "(a]lthough each of us is defined by race and gender, those of us who are neither white nor 
male often experience invisibility as a result of our dual subordinate status"). I chose to address 
specifically the simultaneous influence of race and gender in the lives of Black female athletes 
because of my firsthand knowledge and experiences with such discrimination. However, it is 
conceivable that the arguments raised in this Note could be made similarly by any other women 
of color, as well as other oppressed women in society (i.e., lesbians, the poor, and the 
handicapped). 
3. Yarbrough, supra note 2, at 234-35. 
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portant cultural phenomena and play a pervasive role in our society."4 
Indeed, sports often serve as an important source of identity for us as 
participants and fans based on our affiliation with teams, players, 
schools or simply as individuals.5 
My life serves as the perfect example of the myriad ways sport 
can enhance the quality of life and provide numerous opportunities. 
My participation facilitated an entrance into higher education and 
taught me commitment, discipline, teamwork and other worthwhile 
virtues necessary to succeed in life. My parents, both athletes in their 
day, introduced me to sports very early on. In my elementary school 
years, I participated in a Saturday morning basketball league at my 
small, private Quaker school. My parents also introduced me to track, 
gymnastics, and tennis. My introduction into tennis lead to years of 
junior tennis tournaments, a tennis scholarship to Northwestern Uni-
versity, and a four-year stint on the professional women's tennis tour. 
During that time, miraculously, I managed to avoid the pitfalls tradi-
tionally associated with "the teenage years." With two practices per 
day, regular school days and weekends full of various competitions, I 
simply did not have the time or energy to get into trouble. Athletics 
has indeed served me well. 
As a young Black girl, I had the opportunity to be exposed to 
both mainstream sports and those in which minorities are traditionally 
underrepresented. That exposure changed my life for the better be-
cause I was able to convert opportunity into success.6 The advantages 
I enjoyed as the daughter of a lawyer and a doctor, sadly, are not 
enjoyed in large numbers within my race: I am the exception not the 
rule. And without access to all types of sports, I would never have 
realized and developed my talents in tennis, typically viewed as a 
country club sport reserved for the white elite. 
Just as the world of sport carries innumerable benefits and 
evinces all that is good within our culture, regretfully, the world of 
sport also mirrors the ills of the larger society.7 Of the most prevalent 
4. Matthew J. Mitten, Sports Law as a Reflection of Society's Laws and Values: Forward, 38 
s. TEX. L. REV. 999, 999 (1997). 
5. See id. 
6. See generally Elliott Almond, Title IX 25 Years Later-Minority Women Worry About 
Which Sports Get Support, SEATILE TIMES, June 22, 1997, at All (noting that minority leaders 
seek to integrate sports in which minorities are traditionally underrepresented because, "where 
there is opportunity for athletes of color, there is success"). 
7. Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda For Women and Sports in the 1990s, 
3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105, 136 (1991) (stating that sport is no different than the larger society 
106 [voL. 42:105 
In the Title IX Race Toward Gender Equity 
evils are sex and racial discrimination, and the resulting inequities 
which continue to mar the playing field. However, despite the impor-
tance of sport to the larger society and the existence of discrimination 
therein, "sports has historically not been the subject of serious aca-
demic study."8 
Race and gender inequities are all too prevalent in intercollegiate 
athletics.9 The general inequities suffered by all women are com-
pounded in the lives of Black women because of the additional burden 
of racism. Specifically, Title IX has benefited white women more than 
Black women.10 White women attend college in greater numbers than 
their Black counterparts and "many colleges and universities have 
complied with Title IX by adding women's sports, such as golf, squash, 
and tennis, which are played predominantly by white women."11 
Despite the simultaneous influence of race and gender endured 
by Black women, the legal remedies for race and gender discrimina-
tion are separate.12 A host of laws exist to address racial inequities. 
Specifically, racial bias is countered by State and Federal Constitu-
tional claims, the Civil Rights Act of 196413 to a small degree, and 
private causes of action (contract and tort). 14 Additionally, the gen-
and therefore the same social ills that plague the larger society pervade the world of intercollegi-
ate sports). 
8. Mitten, supra note 4, at 1000; Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persis-
tence of Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 616 (1995) (noting that "the 
dearth of scholarship concerning the adverse implications of racism for African-Americans in-
volved in college sport underscores the importance of beginning a candid dialogue on racism in 
sport"). 
9. See Olson, supra note 7, at 136. See also, Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance ls Not 
Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender Equity In Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REv. 329, 330-
31 (1996). 
10. See Note, Cheering On Women And Girls In Sports: Using Title IX To Fight Gender 
Role Oppression, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1635 (1997) [hereinafter Cheering On Women]. 
11. Id. See also Mitten, supra note 4, at 1002 n.5 (citing Yarbrough, A Sporting Chance: The 
Intersection of Race and Gender, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1033 (1997)) ("As an illustration, 
[Yarbrough] points to the efforts of educational institutions to comply with Title IX by increasing 
athletic participation opportunities for women by adding 'country club' (golf, tennis, swimming) 
and 'prep school' (lacrosse, field hockey) sports as well as 'walk-on' sports to attract students 
already enrolled at the school. Because educationally and economically disadvantaged women 
(categories which include a significant percentage of African-American women) have not tradi-
tionally participated in these sports, African-American women effectively are denied the oppor-
tunity to participate in sports within their interests and abilities."); Almond, supra note 6, at All 
(noting that "[a]t issue are the kinds of college sports being introduced in the name of gender 
equity - golf, gymnastics, rowing, soccer, tennis and water polo. In the U.S., these sports usually 
favor participants of some means. In the racial divide of America, that often translates to mean 
those from suburban white neighborhoods."). 
12. See Smith, supra note 9, at 353-54. 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1998). 
14. See Smith, supra note 9, at 353-54. 
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eral unwillingness of courts to recognize Black women as a separate 
and distinct class of plaintiff due to their unique "dual disability"15 at 
the intersection of race and gender leaves Black women no choice but 
to "take sides against themselves."16 
Title IX is the primary vehicle for protection against gender dis-
crimination in the context of federally funded education programs. 
Title IX, however, only seeks to remedy one class of discrimination: 
gender, not race. Countless articles deal with the interpretation, his-
torical development, and application of Title IX since 1972, and nu-
merous articles address racism in intercollegiate athletics. However, 
few deal specifically with the issue of intersectionality and the chal-
lenge of current jurisprudence to protect Black female athletes when 
they are discriminated against based on their gender and race 
simultaneously. 
Arthur Mathewson attempts to address the issue in his article 
Function At The Junction.17 Mathewson "examine[s] the meaning of 
gender equity for Black women and sketch[ es] a general framework 
for principles to aid the formulation of sports policy on gender equity 
as it applies to Black women."18 Mathewson makes an admirable at-
tempt to shed light on the invisibility suffered by Black women as they 
attempt to "function at the junction" of race and gender. Yet he hon-
estly and rightly notes early in his analysis that he possesses only an 
ability to intellectualize about the Black woman's challenge; "[he 
does] not claim to 'get it."'19 Accordingly, the story of the Black fe-
male athlete needs to be told by a member of the group; one who not 
only sympathizes but empathizes with the experience of sisters in the 
pursuit of athletic inclusion. 
Part One will outline the statute, regulations, Policy Interpreta-
tion and the leading case in Title IX jurisprudence. Part Two will ad-
dress the Critical Race Theory Doctrine of Intersectionality to 
demonstrate the importance of recognizing that Black women hold a 
station in life distinguishable from Black men and white women. Part 
15. Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our 
Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 10 (1989). Scales-Trent states that because of this "dual 
disability," and its negative legacy ... "the problems of Black women often go unrecognized." 
Further, "[b]y creating two separate categories for its major social problems -'the race problem,' 
and 'the women's issue'- society has ignored the group which stands at the interstices of these 
two groups, black women in America." Id. 
16. Yarbrough, supra note 2, at 236. 
17. Mathewson, supra note 1. 
18. Id. at 241. 
19. Id. at 242. 
108 [voL. 42:105 
In the Title IX Race Toward Gender Equity 
Three will chronicle the unique history of Black women in America 
and in sport, to show that sport is a microcosm of the greater society 
with the same ills that plague the greater community. Finally, Part 
Four will examine and compare Title VII jurisprudence and it's recog-
nition of Black women as a separate and distinct class of plaintiff to 
Title IX jurisprudence. 
I. TITLE IX: THE STATUTE, THE REGULATIONS, POLICY 
INTERPRETATION AND COHEN V. 
BROWN UNIVERSITY 
[Title IX] provides a remedy to black women, but only to the extent 
they are injured by the force of gender discrimination like that faced 
by white women. It does not provide a remedy to them to the ex-
tent that their participation in competitive athletics is and has been 
impacted by the force of racial discrimination or the simultaneous 
action of both forces. Nor does the law of gender equity provide 
them a remedy to the extent such participation has been impacted 
by any force of discrimination directed specifically toward Black 
women.20 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197221 is the federal 
law which prohibits federally funded education programs from dis-
criminating on the basis of sex, including sports programs.22 Title IX 
states in pertinent part: "No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving federal financial assistance."23 Authors Brake and 
Catlin observed that "Title IX has been the primary vehicle for assert-
ing the right of women and girls to equal opportunity in high school 
and college athletics, and has played a vital role in opening competi-
tive sports to female athletes over the last [twenty-five] years."24 
Congress passed Title IX to stifle rampant discrimination on the 
basis of sex at every level of education.25 The Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare ("HEW") subsequently issued its regulations 
20. Id. at 244-45. 
21. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681-88 (1998). 
22. See Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, Gender & Sports: Setting A Course For College 
Athletics: The Path Of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity In Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 51, 52 (1996). 
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1998). 
24. Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 52. 
25. See id. at 53. 
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in the summer of 1975.26 One regulation, codified at 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.37(c) and § 106.41, addresses athletic programs in particular.27 
Part one of this regulation refers to athletic scholarships offered for 
"interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics. "28 "The chief goal of this 
segment of the regulation is to ensure that scholarship monies are 
awarded in proportion to the number of students of each sex partici-
pating in athletic programs."29 The second part of the regulation 
speaks more broadly to encompass equal opportunities between t)le 
sexes in "'any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural' ath-
letic program offered by a federally funded institution."30 
The regulation reads as follows: 
(c) Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors in-
terscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall pro-
vide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In 
determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director 
will consider, among other factors: 
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition 
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members 
of both sexes; 
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies; 
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time; 
(4) Travel and per diem allowance; 
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; 
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive 
facilities; 
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; 
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; 
(10) Publicity. 
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or une-
qual expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates 
or sponsors separate teams will not constitute non-compliance with 
this section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to 
26. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1998). 
27. See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1998). 
28. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F.Supp. 978, 983 (D. R.I. 1992) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)) 
(hereinafter Cohen I] aff d, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (hereinafter Cohen II], 879 F.Supp 185 
(D. R.I. 1995) (trial on the merits) (hereinafter Cohen III], aff din part, rev'd on other grounds, 
101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming the reasoning and holding of the district court, reversing 
as to remedy) (hereinafter Cohen IV]. 
29. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 983. 
30. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)). 
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provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality 
of opportunity for members of each sex.31 
Title IX carried a three year transition period for compliance and 
during that time HEW's office received nearly 100 complaints of al-
leged violations. 32 In response, HE W's Office for Civil Rights 
("OCR") declared a need to provide post-secondary institutions with 
"'a framework within which complaints can be resolved and to pro-
vide ... additional guidance on the requirements of compliance with 
Title IX."33 
The final Policy Interpretation, issued in 1979, provided a detailed 
outline of "factors and standards" for courts to use to determine 
whether a school was in compliance in the area of intercollegiate ath-
letics.34 Specifically, the Policy Interpretation set out a three-pronged 
test of compliance and the requirement that a school must satisfy at 
least one prong in order to be found in compliance with "Title IX's 
requirement to provide proportionate participation opportunities. "35 
Id. 
The test set forth in the Policy Interpretation is as follows: 
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for 
male and female students are provided in numbers substantially 
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or 
(2) Where numbers of one sex have been and are under-represented 
among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a 
history and continuing practice of program expansion which is de-
monstrably responsive to the developing interests and abilities of 
the members of that sex; or 
(3) Where members of one sex are under-represented among inter-
collegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing 
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it 
31. 34 C.F.R. § l06.41(c) (1998). The Title IX regulations became effective on July 21, 1975. 
32. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 56 n.30 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d} (1995)). 
Section 106.41 states that, "[a] recipient which operates or sponsors ... athletics at the secondary 
or post-secondary school level shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but 
in no event later than three years from the effective date of this regulation." Id. 
33. Id. at 56 n.31 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979)). 
34. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414 (1998). "The factors and standards were enumerated for 
compliance in scholarships, accommodation of interest and abilities, and other program areas 
such as equipment, travel, tutoring, coaching and recruitment." Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, 
at 56 n.36. Note that the Policy Interpretation does not have the force of law, but serves as the 
clearest interpretation of the criteria for compliance. Id. at 57. 
35. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 61-62. 
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can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of that sex have 
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.36 
The stated purpose of the Policy Interpretation is to: 
clarif[y] the obligations which recipients of Federal aid have under 
Title IX to provide equal opportunities in athletic programs. In par-
ticular, this Policy Interpretation provides a means to assess an insti-
tution's compliance with the equal opportunity requirements of the 
regulation which are set forth at [34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) and 
§ 106.41(c)].37 
Brake and Catlin explain how the analysis flows from the three-
pronged test: 
Under the first prong, the court examines whether athletic partici-
pation opportunities are provided to each sex in numbers substan-
tially proportionate to their enrollment. If a school cannot meet 
this prong, the court then determines whether the school can 
demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program expan-
sion for the underrepresented sex. If a school fails the second 
prong, the court finally asks whether the athletic interests and abili-
ties of the underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively ac-
commodated by the school. If the plaintiffs can show that the 
school also fails on this third prong, then the court must find the 
school out of compliance with Title IX.38 
An additional source used to provide information and guidelines 
to assess compliance is the Clarification Memorandum issued by the 
Department of Education, on January 16, 1996.39 That memorandum 
does not alter the existing standards for compliance but rather it "con-
tains many examples illustrating how institutions may meet each 
prong of the three-part test and explains how participation opportuni-
ties are to be counted under Title IX. "40 
When Congress first passed Title IX, it did not appear to apply to 
intercollegiate and interscholastic athletics programs.41 In fact, the 
Supreme Court held in Grove City v. Bell that "Title IX did not apply 
to programs like athletics that do not receive direct financial assist-
36. Smith, supra note 9, at 356 (citing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A 
Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979) 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1990)). 
37. Cohen I, 809 F.Supp. 978, 983 (D. R.I. 1992) (citing 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,415). 
38. Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 62. 
39. Cohen IV, 101 F.3d 155, ~67 (1st Cir. 1996). 
40. Id. 
41. See William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown University and the Future of 
Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 84 Eo. LAW REP. 611, 615 (1993). 
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ance."42 However, Congress quickly acted to clarify its intent and 
passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.43 That Act super-
seded Grove City and held that "all aspects of an institution of higher 
education are covered by Title IX."44 The Restoration Act became 
effective on March 22, 1988, and is applicable to all institutions which 
receive federal funds for their athletic programs.45 
Authors Thro and Snow note that Title IX claims generally fall 
into three categories: (1) "equal treatment' cases such as Cook v. Col-
gate University, where the women athletes and/or their coaches assert 
that their male counterparts on the same or similar teams are treated 
better than they are and demand that there be equal treatment"; (2) 
"'substitution' cases, ... where women athletes in a particular sport 
protest a decision to drop their sport in favor of another women's 
sports [sic]"; and (3) "'affirmative action' cases, ... where women or 
men athletes demand that the university add new women's teams or 
reinstate discontinued women's teams as a means of increasing the 
percentage of athletes who are women."46 
One case of particular importance in the gender equity debate is 
Cohen v. Brown University, which falls in the latter category.47 Be-
cause Cohen is the first accommodations case to be subjected to ap-
pellate review, I will analyze it to show how colleges and universities 
typically attempt to comply with Title IX and the current judicial 
response.48 
The issues in Cohen v. University were first presented in Cohen I 
in 1992, by student members of the women's gymnastics and volleyball 
teams that Brown University ("Brown") demoted as part of a cost-
cutting plan. The student-athletes, on behalf of a certified class, filed a 
class action suit against Brown and its president, alleging Title IX vio-
lations. The court in Cohen I issued a preliminary injunction which 
restored the teams to varsity status pending an actual trial on the mer-
42. Id. (citing Grove City v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)). 
43. Id. (citing P.L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)). 
44. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1685 (1992)). 
45. See id. 
46. Id. at 612-13. 
47. Cohen I, 809 F.Supp. 978 (D. R.I. 1992) (granting preliminary injunction), affd, 991 
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), 879 F.Supp 185 (D. RI. 1995) (trial on the merits), affd in part, rev'd on 
other grounds, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming the reasoning and holding of the district 
court, reversing as to remedy}. Each of the major court decisions that interpreted Title IX dealt 
with allegations of discrimination "in the allocation of participation opportunities between male 
and female athletes," which is the type of discrimination most often alleged. Brake & Catlin, 
supra note 22, at 61. 
48. See Thro & Snow, supra note 41, at 613. 
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its.49 Brown appealed and the court in Cohen II upheld the lower 
court preliminary injunction.50 On remand, the court in Cohen III 
held that Brown violated Title IX, whereupon Brown moved for addi-
tional findings of fact and to amend judgment. The court, however, 
denied the university's motion. Brown timely appealed, and the court 
in Cohen IV upheld the reasoning and holdings of the lower court. 
The Court did, however, reverse the district court's rejection of 
Brown's proffered compliance plan and remanded the case to give 
Brown the opportunity to fashion a new plan.51 
Brown is a National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") 
Division I institution for all sports except football, and accordingly its 
student-athletes compete at the highest level of intercollegiate athlet-
ics.52 Brown operates a "two-tiered intercollegiate athletics program" 
based on two types of funding: university-funded and donor-funded 
varsity teams.53 
When Brown demoted two women's teams and two men's teams 
to donor-funded status, plaintiffs filed a suit alleging that at the time 
of the demotion, men students already enjoyed a disproportionately 
large share of resources and participation opportunities.54 Thus, 
"what appeared to be the even-handed demotions of two men's and 
two women's teams, in fact, perpetuated Brown's discriminatory treat-
ment of women in the administration of its intercollegiate athletics 
program. "55 
The Court examined the evidence presented at the district court 
level regarding the participation/enrollment disparity percentages.56 
As of the 90-91 academic year, Brown funded 31 varsity teams, 16 for 
men and 15 for women, and of the 894 student-athletes, 63.3% were 
men and 36.7% were women.57 By comparison, the enrollment per-
centages were 52.4% and 47.6%, respectively. As of the 93-94 aca-
demic year, the participation/enrollment percentages were 61.87%/ 
48.86% for men and 38.13%/51.14% for women.58 At that time, there 
49. See Cohen I, 809 F.Supp. at 1001. 
50. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888, 907 (1993). 
51. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d 155, 155 (1996). 
52. See id. at 162 (citing Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. 185, 188 (1995)). 
53. See id. 
54. See id. at 163. 
55. Id. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. (citing Cohen I, 809 F.Supp. 978, 980 (D. R.l. 1992)). 
58. See id. (citing Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. 185, 192 (D. R.l. 1995)). 
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were 16 varsity sports for men and 16 for women.59 Additionally, vir-
tually all men's sports were created before 1927 while virtually all wo-
men's sports were created between 1971-1977.60 In fact, the only 
women's sport added since 1977 is winter track, added in 1982.61 
The district court in Cohen III reviewed these facts and found 
that "Brown maintained a 13.01 % disparity between female participa-
tion in intercollegiate athletics and female student enrollment, and 
that 'although the number of varsity sports offered to men and women 
are equal, the selection of sports offered to each gender generates far 
more individual positions for male athletes than for female ath-
letes.' "62 The Cohen III court chose to examine the number of actual 
participants rather than simply the equal number of teams offered63 
because men's sports generally involve more players (i.e., football 
and soccer teams).64 As a result, the Court upheld the district court's 
holding that Brown failed to effectively accommodate both genders 
under§ 106.41(c)(l) and hence violated Title IX.65 
One of the arguments presented by Brown in Cohen W was that 
the district court's requirement for numerical parity transformed Title 
IX into an "affirmative action statute."66 The Court rejected this ar-
gument and explained that Title IX is an anti-discrimination statute 
and that "[l]ike other anti-discrimination statutory schemes, the Title 
IX regime permits affirmative action . . . [and] an inference that a 
significant gender-based statistical disparity may indicate the existence 
of discrirnination."67 The Court went on to note that one cannot con-
clude from the fact that a judicial remedy is gender-conscious that 
"the remedy constitutes 'affirmative action. "'68 
Brown also argued that the district court's decision in substance, 
and its application of the three-part test found in the Policy Interpre-
59. See id. (citing Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. at 192). 
60. See id. (citing Cohen l, 809 F.Supp. at 980). 
61. See id. (citing Cohen l, 809 F.Supp. at 980). 
62. Id. at 163-64 (citing Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. at 198). 
63. The Court in Cohen IV affirmed the Cohen II reasoning that a court may not find a 
Title IX violation "solely because there is a disparity between the percentage of students en-
rolled and the percentage of students participating in athletics." Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 164-65 
(citing Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 895). 
64. Rodney Smith suggests that schools create women's football teams to help achieve eq-
uity in actual numbers. This would create a significant number of participation opportunities 
and would also include a wider range of women (all races and socioeconomic backgrounds) than 
the country club and prep school sports. See Mitten, supra note 4, at 1003-1004. 
65. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 166 (citing Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897). 
66. Id. at 170. 
67. Id. at 170-71. 
68. Id. at 172. 
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tation, forces it to give preferential treatment to women "in excess of 
women's relative interests and abilities."69 The Court negated 
Brown's argument, noting that schools have a responsibility to fully 
and effectively accommodate the interests of the underrepresented 
gender.70 It is simply not enough, explained the Court, to give merely 
some accommodation.71 The Cohen IV Court also reasoned that 
"[t]he fact that the overrepresented gender is less than fully accommo-
dated will not, in and of itself, excuse a shortfall in the provision of 
opportunities for the underrepresented gender."72 
In Cohen IV, the Court articulated explicitly the way that Title IX 
is to operate: 
Title IX operates to ensure that the gender-segregated allocation of 
athletics opportunities does not disadvantage either gender. Rather 
than create a quota or preference, this unavoidably gender-con-
scious comparison merely provides for the allocation of athletics re-
sources and participation opportunities between the sexes in a non-
discriminatory· manner.73 
The last significant defense presented by Brown asserted a "rela-
tive interest" argument which provided that any disparity in participa-
tion between men and women is a result of "a lack of interest ... that 
is unrelated to a lack of opportunities."74 The Court reviewed 
Brown's argument "with great suspicion" in light of the purpose of 
Title IX: "to remedy discrimination that results from stereotyped no-
tions of women's interests and abilities."75 The next point made by 
the Court is of major importance to the discussion of gender equity as 
well as the intersectional approach that I assert. It explained that an 
athlete's interest and ability" 'rarely develop in a vacuum' [but rather] 
they evolve as a function of opportunity and experience. "76 The 
Court insightfully notes that Brown's argument does not evince a true 
measure of women's interest and abilities but instead serves as an ex-
69. Id. at 174. 
70. See id. at 174 (citing Cohen II, 879 F.Supp. at 899) (emphasis added). 
71. See id. (citing Cohen II, 879 F.Supp. at 899) (emphasis added). 
72. Id. at 175 (citing Cohen II, 879 F.Supp. at 899). 
73. See id. at 177. 
74. Id. at 178. 
75. Id. at 178-79. 
76. Id. at 179. "[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned gender-based discrimina-
tion based upon 'archaic and overbroad generalizations' about women." Id. (citing Schlesinger 
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)). 
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ample "of the very discrimination that is and has been the basis for 
women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports."77 
One could use the Court's reasoning to springboard to an argu-
ment for the lack of access and opportunity experienced by Black wo-
men due to their dual disability: the combination of race and gender 
discrimination. . While some may argue that Black women have not 
evinced sufficient interest or ability in sports in which they are tradi-
tionally underrepresented, I would argue, as the Cohen IV court 
does78, that the absence of Black women's participation in large num-
bers in country club and prep school sports is evidence of the discrimi-
nation that precludes them from exposure to such sports early in their 
development. As stated, my life serves as the perfect example of what 
early exposure can lead to in the lives of young Black girls. But for 
my introduction to tennis at an early age, I would never have devel-
oped an interest in the sport nor the ability to perform at an advanced 
level. My potential would have always existed. However, only the 
combination of that potential and an opportunity for exposure lead to 
my participation and success in tennis at every level of the game. 
Title IX will never achieve it's ultimate goal of gender equity if it 
does not articulate policies specifically geared to address the unique 
form of discrimination experienced by Black women. The continued 
addition of country club and prep school sports to achieve equity with-
out corresponding programs to introduce such sports to Black girls at 
an early age will leave a significant portion of women out of the run-
ning for gender equity. In order to further expound on the aforemen-
tioned proposition, we next explore the doctrine of intersectionality. 
II. THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF RACE AND GENDER 
The Critical Race Theory Doctrine of Intersectionality, which is 
closely associated with Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, attempts to in-
tegrate into employment discrimination law the actual experiences of 
an outsider group, in this instance, the experiences of African-Ameri-
can women.79 Angela P. Harris explains: "[i]ntersectionality posits 
that African-American women share unique life experiences that dif-
77. Id. at 179. 
78. Id. at 179 (The court reasons that lack of athletic ability and interest are often the result 
of little experience and few opportunities, and further, that discrimination is the basis for so few 
opportunities). 
79. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 u. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139. 
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fer from those of African-American men or white women."80 The 
doctrine places the experiences of African-American women at the 
intersection of race and gender. Hence, to the extent that anti-dis-
crimination laws analyze discrimination claims on a "single axis" 
framework (as does Title IX gender equity law), they necessarily fail 
to adequately address the discrimination felt by Black women as a 
result of multiple axes of influence.81 
Arthur Mathewson uses a chemistry analogy to describe the the-
ory of intersectionality: 
If the mixture [of race and gender] were actually a compound or 
solution, it would have properties that are different from the sum of 
the properties of the individual elements. Those new properties 
might cause it to be subject to forces that would not act upon the 
individual elements.82 
When intersectionality is viewed in intercollegiate athletics, one 
can see that Title IX has failed Black women in numerous ways. This 
failure is examined by Wendy Olson: 
Title IX has done little to address the diverse needs and problems of 
groups within the women's sports movement, including those of wo-
men of color . . . . If it does not address the needs of all its mem-
bers, the women's sports movement is a movement without a sense 
of itself. Despite the visibility of [several Black female athletes], the 
African-American woman has been largely absent from sport in two 
ways. First, African-American women are an overwhelmingly small 
proportion of those participating in collegiate sports. Second, when 
they do participate, African-American women are usually typecast 
into only a handful of sports.83 
While it would be inaccurate to state that Black women have not 
benefited from the passage of Title IX, the concern is that Black fe-
males are not recejving benefits in equal proportion to those enjoyed 
by white females.84 Mathewson argues that Title IX is not as effective 
in the lives of Black women because the statute is incapable of reme-
dying "the historical station of Black women in sports."85 
80. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741, 832 
(1994). 
81. See id. However, the issue of intersectionality does not negate the fact that Black wo-
men can experience pure racism and pure sexism. See also Scales-Trent, supra note 15. 
82. Mathewson, supra note 1, at 244. 
83. Olson, supra note 8, at 127. 
84. See Marilyn Yarbrough, A Sporting Chance: The Intersection of Race and Gender, 38 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1035 (1997). 
85. Mathewson, supra note 1, at 251. Mathewson's assertion is premised on his argument 
that Title IX's "equality model" is flawed because its singular focus is to remedy inequality and 
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The reality is that "maleness" and "whiteness" have carried great 
value in America for a long time. Thus, historically, Black women 
have been relegated to a subordinate position based on both race and 
gender.B6 Nonetheless, Scarborough notes that "Black women have 
not been viewed as a separate group with different concerns and ex-
periences from both white women and Black men."B7 Accordingly, 
society tends to use broad based essentialist terms such as "Blacks" 
and "women," which translate into Black men and white women.BB 
The result is the reinforcement of the "invisibility of Black women. "B9 
Beverly Kearney spoke of her 'foothold' in the two conflicting 
worlds of race and gender in an article written by Elliott Almond.90 
In 1997, Kearney was chosen to head the National College Track 
Coaches Association and became the first African-American and the 
first woman to hold that title.91 Almond reported that Kearney was 
disturbed by the reality that the subject of race is rarely discussed (or 
even acknowledged) in the national movement for gender equity.92 
The result of this awkward silence, says Kearney, is a "growing tension 
among African-American women who see race as the unwanted 
stepchild in the fight for equal rights on the playing fields. "93 
In the same article, Donna Lopiano, Executive Director of the 
Women's Sports Foundation, responded to Kearney's observations by 
asserting that race and gender are two different issues "which should 
be attacked fervently - but separately."94 Perhaps the reluctance to 
embrace an intersectional approach is linked to the socially con-
structed perception that Blacks and women must compete for "limited 
pieces of the sports participation pie."95 Yet the single-axis approach 
asserted by Lopiano fails to recognize that current gender equity law 
provides a remedy to Black women "only to the extent they are in-
little else. It is further flawed in its presupposition that interest and ability are evenly distributed 
within gender and that all women stand on equal footing. Id. at 259, 260. 
86. See Cathy Scarborough, Note, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment Exper-
iences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457, 1458 (1989). 
87. Id. 
88. See id. (emphasis added). Essentialist theorists, like Angela P. Harris, illustrate the 
invisibility of Black women by asserting that "[t]he essence of gender is a white woman model, 
the essence of Blacks is a Black male model." See also Mathewson, supra note 1, at 243. 
89. Scarborough, supra note 86, at 1458. 
90. See Almond, supra note 6, at All. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Yarbrough, supra note 2, at 236 (citing Rosemary L. Bray, Taking Sides Against Our-
selves, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 17, 1991, at 56). 
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jured by the force of gender discrimination like that faced by white 
women."96 To the extent that Black women's athletic experiences are 
compromised by racism, or the simultaneous influence of racism and 
sexism, there is no remedy under Lopiano's approach.97 
Timothy Davis asserts that the uni-axis approach to gender equity 
and the pervasive sentiment expressed by Lopiano illustrates 
"America's aversion to confronting directly the question of race in the 
context of sport. "98 Davis goes on to acknowledge the "blissful igno-
rance" of those who choose not to address the multiple factors of, 
among others, race and gender and their influences on college athlet-
ics.99 In reality, it is impossible to successfully separate racial oppres-
sion from gender discrimination in the lives of Black women because 
"they are most often experienced simultaneously."100 As a result, 
commentators believe that a comprehensive agenda for women and 
sports in the 1990s must "recognize the diversity of women in and out 
of the women's sports movement; and address the needs of all women 
in sports .... "101 
The analysis of intersectionality in the context of intercollegiate 
athletics is extremely beneficial to understanding the broad themes 
within the Critical Race movement "[s]ince [sports] represents a mi-
crocosm of American society."102 "[T]he historical reality of Afro-
American women's continuous life-and-death struggle for survival and 
liberation" was born out of the "Black women's extremely negative 
relationship to the American political system (a system of white male 
rule)," which, says a Black feminist collective, "has always been deter-
mined by our membership in two oppressed racial and sexual 
castes."103 Because discrimination encountered by African-Ameri-
cans in intercollegiate sports "cannot be appreciated apart from the 
96. Mathewson, supra note 1, at 244-45. 
97. See id. 
98. Davis, supra note 8, at 620. 
99. See id. at 621. 
100. Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY 
BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF CoLoR 210, 213 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua 
eds., 2nd ed. 1983). "The Combahee River Collective is a Black feminist group in Boston whose 
name comes from the guerrilla action conceptualized and led by Harriet Tubman on June 2, 
1863, in the Port Royal region of South Carolina. This action freed more than 750 slaves and is 
the only military campaign in American history planned and led by a woman." Id. at 210. 
101. Olson, supra note 7, at 108. 
102. Davis, supra note 8, at 617. 
103. Combahee River Collective, supra note 100, at 210. 
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historical and social context from which those impediments spring. "104 
Next, the historical treatment of Black Women in America will be 
traced in order to show how the larger community ills continue to 
plague the microcosms of society like the arena of sport. 
III. THE HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA AND 
IN SPORT 
An examination of racism in college sport provides an opportunity 
for a discussion in a discrete context of the larger social significance 
of unconscious racism ... [R]acial justice for African-Americans in 
college athletics, as in society, remains illusive, absent recognition of 
the impact of racism. Racism in sport thus represents a reflection of 
the pathology that pervades our society in general.105 
Cathy Scarborough explains in her article that Black women have 
always worked in America.106 Black women labored long hours as 
slaves both in the fields and in the homes of slave owners. As the 
fledgling country developed, Black women continued to labor as 
sharecroppers and domestics, factory workers, skilled and unskilled 
laborers, teachers, professionals-translation: slaves by any other 
name. In addition to holding at least one job, Black women fulfilled 
their "womanly" duty to care for their husbands, lovers, parents and 
children.107 Despite this "history of industriousness," Black women 
have consistently faced racism and sexism in the work place; in fact 
Scarborough asserts that these forms of discrimination were impossi-
ble to avoid.108 Judy Scales-Trent notes in Women of Color at the 
Center, that women of color continue to hold "marginal jobs" in dis-
proportionate numbers.109 
104. Davis, supra note 8, at 623. See also Olson, supra note 7, at 149 ("For African-Ameri-
can women, the barriers to actual participation in sport can only be eliminated by addressing the 
role of the African-American woman in society."). 
105. Davis, supra note 8, at 616. 
106. See Scarborough, supra note 86, at 1457. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See Judy Scales-Trent, Women of Color at the Center: Selection From The Third National 
Conference On Women of Color And the Law: Women of Color and Health: Issues of Gender, 
Community, and Power, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1357, 1358 (1991). Women of color continue to oc-
cupy the "marginal jobs which provide no training, little security, no possibility of advancement, 
jobs where the wages are depressed because of the color and sex of the job holder. Women of 
color are the maids, the cleaners. They are the health care workers at the bottom rung of the 
health care industry; the lowest paid clericals; the women hidden in the sweatshops and the 
fields." Id. 
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Despite the obvious presence and prevalence of gender and race 
discrimination (or the combination of the two) in the work place, 
Black women have received little protection in American court 
rooms. Scarborough notes that the legal system, "has consistently ig-
nored the[] social history [of Black women] and failed to truly under-
stand their experiences or address their concerns."110 
Clearly, the kind of job available is inextricably linked with the 
level and kind of education received.111 The sad reality is that chil-
dren of color receive substandard education far more often than their 
white counterparts. Scales-Trent makes the following observations: 
"Even in so-called integrated schools, second-generation discrimina-
tion funnels disproportionate numbers of these children into lower ac-
ademic groups. With a decent education, some [children of color] 
might be able to stretch beyond the reach of racism. Without it, they 
will not."112 
Education, in turn, is linked to the type of neighborhood in which 
one resides.113 Women of color, often the primary (or sole) care-prov-
iders in the home, are often "selectively segregated" into ghettos by 
"landlords, mortgage money lenders, house sellers, and the municipal 
housing authorities."114 In ghettos, where resources and funding are 
severely compromised, the result is a substandard education that often 
relegates women of color to marginal occupations.U5 
Black women also have a long history of political powerlessness 
in America.116 Scales-Trent cites a 1976 study of the quality of Ameri-
can life that reinforces an earlier finding: "[C]ompared to white wo-
men and black and white men, [Black women] were shown to have the 
lowest levels of trust in the political process and the lowest feelings of 
political efficacy."117 The study also reported that Black women suffer 
from a more negative overall sense of well-being and general satisfac-
tion than any other segment of the population.118 Clearly, Black wo-
men have a unique history within the larger society plagued by 
discrimination based on race, gender, and the combination of the two. 
110. Scarborough, supra note 86, at 1457. 
111. See Scales-Trent, supra note 109, at 1360. 
112. Id. . 
113. See id. 
114. Id. 
115. See id. 
116. See Scales-Trent, supra note 15, at 33. 
117. Id. at 33-34. 
118. See id. at 34. 
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A. History of Black Women in Sport 
Lack of access historically has been the case for Black women in 
two major ways: '(a) Black women have been disproportionately lo-
cated at the lower end of the economic hierarchy and, therefore, 
have been unable to afford private golf, swimming, or tennis les-
sons. (b) Overt racial discrimination prevented black women from 
gaining access to the sports participated in by white women.'119 
The benefits of sport in the lives of all people are extensive. The 
benefits in the lives of women in particular are important in light of 
the increased participation of females since Congress passed Title 
IX.120 In 1971, 30,000 women were participating in sports.121 The 
number increased to 135,000 women as of 1997.122 Additionally, par-
ticipation of high school aged girls grew from 300,000 in 1971 to ap-
proximately 2.4 million in 1997.123 
The aforementioned statistics are so encouraging because partici-
pation in sports can benefit females in many ways.124 It can give girls 
greater confidence and an increased sense of self-worth "by providing 
them a forum in which to learn how to assert themselves and, in team 
sports, to do so when others are relying on them. "125 It has also been 
asserted that sports can help girls have a more positive body image.126 
In general, girls have historically been socialized to "maintain their 
appearance" and to avoid any activity that may compromise that ap-
pearance, such as strenuous activity. 127 This creates a vicious cycle 
since if few girls participate, fewer still will be motivated to do so-
perhaps, as one author suggests-because they believe females either 
aren't strong enough to participate or that to participate means that 
119. Yarbrough, supra note 84, at 1037 (citing WILBERT MARCELLUS LEONARD II, A SOCIO-
LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SPORT 261-62 (4th ed. 1993)). 
120. See Cheering On Women, supra note 10, at 1627 (citing Women's Sports Foundation, 
Total Number of Participants in High School and College 1 (Oct. 28, 1996) (unpublished fact 
sheet, on file with the Harvard Law Library); Jere Longman, How The Women Won, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 23; Abby Goodnough, The Perks of Equality, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at Bl; Telephone Interview with Christine Chastine, Women's Sports 
Foundation (April 11, 1997)). 
121. See Cheering On Women, supra note 10, at 1627. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. The author noted that female participation in recreational sports leagues also 
increased. Id. 
124. See Thro & Snow, supra note 41, at 611 (stating that participation in sports tends to 
enhance the participants' "learning of important lessons about teamwork, winning and losing, 
and working hard toward a common goal."). 
125. Cheering On Women, supra note 10, at 1637. 
126. See id. at 1638. 
127. See id. 
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one is masculine.128 To the contrary, females who do participate real-
ize the fallacy in the aforementioned belief. In fact, women are 
neither weak, nor frail, and they also need not be masculine to enjoy 
physical exertion and competition.129 
Historically, Black women have been excluded from the image of 
women as weak and frail. Black women in America have never rested 
on the pedestal created to protect the supposed biologically and spiri-
tually pre-determined timidity of women.13° In fact, "[r]ather than be-
ing seen to possess the same positive feminine heterosexuality as 
white women, women of color athletes are often portrayed as animal-
istic and in need of male control. "131 Mathewson notes that Black 
women defied such taboos about strenuous competitive sport near the 
time of W.W.l.132 In fact, in 1927 Tuskegee Institute was touted as 
having a very successful women's track program.133 
Black women, like white women, were steered away from sports, 
but for different reasons. Black women often had to forego athletic 
opportunities due to "the necessity of work. "134 The late Arthur Ashe 
also made the same observation: 
Most Black women spent very little time in competitive organized 
sport. They worked in the home with few appliances of conven-
ience. There were no washers and dryers, no dishwashers, no dis-
posable diapers, and the average workday was twelve hours long. 
In the South, two-thirds of all Black women who worked outside 
their own homes did so as domestics in the homes of whites. The 
only time for recreation were Sunday and Saturday afternoons.135 
Even when Black women did participate and excel, they were still 
uniquely burdened by more than gender discrimination. Opportuni-
ties for participation, professional pursuits, and resources were ex-
tremely limited (if not non-existent).136 Black women were also 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See Mathewson, supra note 1, at 245. See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 
(1872) ("The paramount destiny and mission of [white] woman are to fulfill the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society."); Olson, 
supra note 7, at 109; Yarbrough, supra note 2, at 235 (noting that in sport participation and the 
greater society, "the experience of the African-American woman has never been that of the 
white woman."). 
131. Cheering on Women, supra note 10, at 1633. 
132. See Mathewson, supra note 1, at 245. 
133. See id. 
134. Id. at 246. 
135. ARTHUR R. AsHE, A HARD RoAD To GLORY 75 (1988). 
136. Mathewson, supra note 1, at 256-57. 
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susceptible to stacking within a· few sports (basketball and track and 
field), a lack of access to other sports, limited facilities, inadequate 
training, and very few role models.137 
Title IX can never achieve its ultimate goal of gender equity un-
less and until policies are developed to address and counteract the 
effect of race on gender equity in the lives of Black women. The is-
sues of race and gender as they affect Black women have been ana-
lyzed in the arena of employment. Therefore, Title VII jurisprudence 
can be used to illustrate the court's recognition of Black women as a 
separate and distinct class of plaintiff in workplace discrimination 
claims. I will next examine Title VII as an analogy to Title IX gender 
equity jurisprudence. 
IV. BLACK WOMEN AS A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
CLASS UNDER TITLE VII AS AN ANALOGY FOR 
TITLE IX GENDER EQUITY 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the legal framework 
under which discrimination claims in the context of the workplace are 
addressed.138 Title VII applies to employers with fifteen or more em-
ployees, 139 and Title VII remedies are limited to equitable relief, 
which includes back pay and front pay, reinstatement or hiring, and 
attorney fees. 140 In pertinent part, Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.141 
137. See id. at 257. 
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1998). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.31, 14 Stat. 27 (1877) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1998)) also addresses race discrimination in the workplace, 
however because this paper addresses race and gender discrimination, I chose to examine Title 
VII which covers both forms of discrimination (among other categories). 
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1998). 
140. See id. § 2000e-5(g) -(k) (1998). 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1998). 
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The primary purpose of the statute, as evidenced by the legisla-
tive history and case law, is "to eradicate 'all aspects of discrimina-
tion.'" Thus, courts have held that Title VII "is a remedial statute to 
be liberally construed in favor of the victim of discrimination."142 
Cast in that light, Scarborough believes that courts have broad inter-
pretive powers with respect to Title VIL When compared with Title 
IX, the questions to be answered are what is the ultimate goal of Title 
IX and whether that ultimate goal can be achieved without addressing 
the unique situation of Black women?143 
The answers, though somewhat difficult to ascertain, can be 
found in Title IX's legislative history. Though sparse, it indicates that 
a major objective of the law is to correct the inequitable treatment of 
women and girls who attend federally funded educational institu-
tions.144 Consequently, all women and girls should benefit equally 
and to the fullest extent the law will allow. 
Numerous Black women have brought Title VII claims against 
employers for alleged discrimination. In those cases, courts have gen-
erally refused to recognize Black women as a separate class of plaintiff 
with a cause of action for discrimination based on race and sex.145 
Courts tend to force Black women to choose either a race or sex claim 
even when a Black woman experiences discrimination based on the 
simultaneous influence of race and gender.146 The articulated ration-
ale for the courts' refusal to honor combination claims of race and 
gender is that there is just no easy way to "unbundle" such multiple 
discrimination.147 Apparently for the sake of administrative conven-
ience, courts either refuse to find Title VII violations based on combi-
nation claims, or implicitly require a ·plaintiff to choose one or the 
other at the pleading stage.148 The unfortunate consequence for Black 
women, as has happened consistently throughout history, is that they 
must divide themselves and force their proverbial roundness into the 
square-like legal structure of Title VIL 
142. Scarborough, supra note 86, at 1473. 
143. See id. 
144. See Mathewson, supra note 1, at 248. 
145. See Scarborough, supra note 86, 1467. 
146. See Judith Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersec-
tion of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL L. REV. 775, 797 (1991). 
147. Id. 
148. See id. See also Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F.Supp. 142 (E.D. 
Mo. 1976). 
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However, a few courts have recognized Black women as a sepa-
rate and distinct Title VII plaintiff and permitted them to assert a 
combined cause of action based on the confluence of race and gen-
der.149 For instance, in Jefferies the court permitted a Black woman to 
sue on the grounds of both race and sex discrimination. Even though 
the plaintiff could not prove race discrimination since a Black man 
was promoted over her, that did not preclude her from filing a com-
bined race/gender cause of action.150 The legal strategy employed in 
Jefferies represents one way to develop "a clear and effective legal 
construct for analyzing race-based gender discrimination .... "151 
Although Title VII cases in which courts recognized the exper-
iences of Black women as distinguishable from those of Black men 
and white women are not directly related to gender equity under Title 
IX, "they are illustrative of the general treatment of Black women in 
society."152 For example, in Degraffenreid, the court refused to recog-
nize Black women as a distinct class due to the fear of a "Pandora's 
Box" scenario.153 Crenshaw's response to this rationale is that "the 
court's refusal ... to acknowledge that Black women encounter com-
bined race and sex discrimination implies that the boundaries of sex 
and race discrimination doctrine are defined respectively by white wo-
men's and Black men's experiences."154 
149. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding under 
Title VII, that discrimination can exist even in th!! absence of discrimination against a black man 
or white woman); Jefferies v. Harris County Comm. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 
1980) (holding that "[r]ecognition of black females for purposes of the prima facie case and 
proof of pretext is the only way to identify and remedy discrimination directed toward black 
females"); but cf Degraffenreid, 413 F.Supp. at 143 (holding that Black female plaintiffs could 
bring an action based on race or sex, but not both. The court feared that recognition of a sepa-
rate class "would give them relief beyond what the drafters ... intended."). 
150. See Winston, supra note 146, at 800 (citing Jefferies v. Harris County Comm. Action 
Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
151. Winston, supra note 146, at 805. Jefferies, however, has been criticized because of its 
"sex-plus" analysis. It is argued that sex-plus cases are little improvement from the either/or 
approach because it "forces Black women to choose gender as their principal identification, 
thereby perpetuating a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of discrimination exper-
ienced by Black women, most of whom do not consider their race to be secondary to their sex." 
Scarborough, supra note 86, at 1471. While I agree that the sex-plus approach is far from per-
fect, its existence can be used to argue that if neutral factors are recognized under the law as 
additional influences, then listed categories (already recognized as protected) should also be 
recognized as valid in combination claims. 
152. Yarbrough, supra note 2, at 234. 
153. See Degraffenreid, 413 F.Supp. at 145. 
154. Crenshaw, supra note 79. 
1998] 127 
How a rd Law Journal 
CONCLUSION 
The Black female athlete's lack of access to historically white 
sports must be remedied by way of heightened sensitivity to the 
unique history and present circumstance of Black women who endure 
the simultaneous influence of race and gender. Without new policies 
and regulations specifically crafted to recognize and eradicate the si-
multaneous influence of race and gender in the lives of Black women, 
Title IX will never achieve it's ultimate goal of gender equity in feder-
ally-funded institutions. Fashioning such regulations and policies will 
jump-start a dialogue on the issue of intersectionality that is long over-
due in the legal community and will serve as a connection between 
those in pursuit of gender equity, those in pursuit of racial equality, 
and those of us who must pursue both goals simultaneously. 
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